MLA Roger Spink recently gave us an important insight into what is happening behind the scenes regarding the future of Falklands telecommunications:
“Officers are working on ways to reach that point and are in regular contact with Sure to make certain that both organisations are in the best possible position to work together effectively once notice is given.”
On the face of it, that makes perfect sense. Sure South Atlantic (Sure) operates critical national infrastructure and, whatever happens after 2027, FIG and Sure will have to work together through a transition. But those words also raise a much bigger question.
When serious commercial negotiations with Sure begin, will FIG negotiate from a position of strength?
This post is inevitably speculative. I don’t know what discussions are taking place between FIG and Sure, who is running them, or what negotiating strategy FIG has adopted. But these are questions to ask before reaching an agreement, not afterwards.
Does FIG Still Have Genuine Alternatives?
FIG may ultimately move towards something broadly resembling the developing St Helena model—potentially involving different infrastructure ownership arrangements while Sure continues to play a substantial operational role. I may be completely wrong. But if Sure believes FIG is heading this way, it could significantly shift the negotiating balance towards Sure.
A basic principle of commercial negotiation is that the other side should believe you have credible alternatives. If Sure concludes that FIG ultimately needs it to deliver its preferred post-2027 model, Sure’s negotiating position becomes considerably stronger. That is why the promised international process matters so much.
FIG has already tested the international market. Cambridge Management Consultants carried out Preliminary Market Engagement on FIG’s behalf in late 2025. FIG now says that the parameters for further international market engagement have not yet been met because of recent geopolitical events. If FIG intends to approach the international market again, it needs to be clear what will be materially different this time.
Repeating a market exercise without significantly changing the proposition being offered is unlikely to produce a fundamentally different result. More importantly, FIG needs credible alternatives at the negotiating table. An international process should not simply confirm that Sure is the easiest option; it should establish what other credible operators could offer and provide FIG with the commercial leverage needed to secure the best possible post-2027 arrangement.
St Helena and Ascension Strengthen Sure’s Negotiating Hand
SHG chose Maestro to build a government-owned fibre network. That project failed, and SHG is now working with Sure on the upgrade. Sure remained on the island and is now working with the St Helena Government on its future telecommunications infrastructure.
At the same time, Sure’s decision to walk away from Ascension strengthens its negotiating position in another way. It shows Sure is prepared to leave a small, difficult market if it does not consider the terms commercially sustainable. That matters in negotiations with FIG.
Sure can therefore point east and say, quite reasonably: look what happened when another small South Atlantic territory tried to replace us. It can also point to Ascension as evidence that FIG should not simply assume Sure will remain whatever terms are offered.
That does not mean FIG should exclude Sure. I have never argued that it should. The lesson from St Helena should instead be that any alternative to Sure must be technically, commercially and financially credible.
But FIG has an equally important lesson: do not let fear of another Maestro — or of Sure walking away — drive them to accept whatever arrangement the incumbent offers.
Who Will Negotiate for the Falkland Islands?
This may be the most important question of all. Sure is not simply a small local telecommunications company. It is part of a much larger Beyon telecommunications group with access to experienced commercial executives, telecommunications specialists and numerous highly qualified lawyers. FIG needs equivalent capability at the table.
These negotiations should involve experienced independent telecommunications commercial expertise, backed by appropriate technical, regulatory and legal specialists. That is different from simply employing a good general commercial negotiator.
Telecommunications agreements cover network ownership, wholesale access, spectrum, investment obligations, service standards, technology, exclusivity, regulation, and exit arrangements. Decisions made in those negotiations could shape Falklands telecommunications for another decade.
FIG should therefore be prepared to explain who is leading these negotiations, what specialist telecommunications expertise supports them, and what safeguards identify and manage potential independence of advice. That should not be commercially sensitive information.
FIG Must Be Prepared to Walk Away
The strongest negotiating position is always having a suitable alternative. That means FIG should not enter negotiations having effectively decided beforehand that Sure must remain the operator. Nor should an international process simply become a mechanism for confirming a decision already made. Genuine alternatives need to be on the table—whether that means another operator, FIG-owned infrastructure with an independent operator, an open-access wholesale model, or some other workable structure.
If Sure wants to continue operating under a new telecommunications licence after 2027, it should have to compete commercially for that opportunity against other interested telecommunications operators. That competition matters not because Sure should be excluded, but because it gives FIG the best chance to negotiate the strongest possible deal for the Falkland Islands. Without genuine competitive pressure, FIG risks negotiating primarily against the terms Sure is prepared to offer rather than against what the wider international market might be prepared to deliver.
FIG must know its red lines. The objective should not simply be to obtain a better deal from Sure. It should be to create a telecommunications structure that prevents the Falkland Islands from becoming locked into another arrangement that becomes extraordinarily difficult and expensive to change. We have already seen how costly contractual rights can become.
Opening the Islands to personal VSAT services led FIG to agree potential compensation to Sure of up to £6 million. Whatever replaces the existing licence must therefore be judged not only by what it delivers in 2028, but by how easily the Falkland Islands can change direction in 2032 or 2035.
How Much Longer Can FIG Wait?
There is another problem: time. The future telecommunications work has now been running for around two years. International market engagement took place nearly a year ago. Notice has still not been given. We are now told that “recent geopolitical events” mean ExCo’s notice and international engagement parameters have not yet been met.
But geopolitical circumstances can change again. So can technology, markets, and the Falkland Islands’ financial position. At some point, waiting for the right conditions becomes a strategic risk in itself. Each passing month potentially strengthens Sure’s position because the time available to develop suitable alternatives shrinks.
Roundup
I hope FIG proves these concerns wrong. I hope it has assembled strong independent telecommunications, commercial, regulatory and legal expertise. I hope several genuine alternatives remain available. And I hope Sure does not already understand FIG’s eventual destination better than potential competitors do.
But after two years of reviews, consultants, market engagement, closed ExCo papers and delayed notice, FIG should no longer expect Islanders simply to assume those safeguards exist. It should demonstrate that they do.
There is nothing wrong with FIG talking to Sure. It would be irresponsible not to. But there is a considerable difference between working constructively with an incumbent and entering negotiations with an incumbent that already knows you need it. Sure will enter these negotiations knowing exactly what it wants. Islanders deserve to know that FIG will do the same.
Chris Gare, OpenFalklands, October 2026, copyright OpenFalklands
